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Abstract 
 
It is widely believed that natural disasters increase human trafficking from the affected region or 
country; however, credible analyses of the causal relationship are lacking. This paper estimates 
the causal effect of natural disaster occurrence on economic factors and the probability of human 
trafficking. I find that there is a significant, positive effect of disasters—as measured by an 
indicator for occurrence as well as disaster intensity—on human trafficking. Moreover, disasters 
negatively impact economic outcomes, suggesting a potential mechanism through which 
disasters indirectly affect trafficking. These findings are policy-relevant for anti-human 
trafficking and disaster relief organizations as they provide empirical evidence for a previously 
hypothesized relationship and may help prioritize the underemphasized rise in trafficking during 
times of inevitable chaos.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The slavery of men, women, and children can be traced back in history to almost every culture, 
nationality, and religion. From ancient times to present day, human exploitation has been a 
global issue, varying in legal and social acceptance and economic importance through the course 
of time. Although today human trafficking has been outlawed everywhere in the world, it 
remains widely prevalent but largely unknown. In fact, The Economist (2005) compares slavery 
to polio. As many westerners relate it with earlier, darker times in human history, its extinction is 
widely assumed. However, while its eradication would demonstrate human progress, like polio, 
that has not yet been the case. 
 
It has been estimated that 20.9 million people worldwide are being exploited at any given time. 
18.7 million (90 percent) are exploited in the private sector, with 68 percent of them being 
victims of forced labor in agriculture, construction, domestic work, or manufacturing, and 22 
percent are victims of forced sexual exploitation (ILO, 2012).  
 
It is important to recognize that while these numbers are most definitely an indication of the size 
of the problem, an accurate estimate of the worldwide magnitude of trafficking and slavery 
victims is unknown and most likely impossible to decipher (Weitzer, 2015). This is due to 
multiple factors such as global definitional issues, the clandestine nature of the crime, and the 
reluctance of victims to come forward out of fear or shame. Without an accurate baseline 
estimate, it is difficult to measure continuities over time, especially changes in the size of the 
problem. Thus, statements asserting that human trafficking is the fastest growing source of 
income for organized crime and that it is the third most important following drugs and arms 
trade, cannot be corroborated.  
 
The issues in lack of consistency and overconfidence in questionable or debunked perceptions of 
trafficking are particularly a problem for empirical work and policymakers. International 
organizations and national governments have attempted to raise public awareness on the issue of 
human trafficking, yet academic research on the topic, especially in economics, remains scarce 
(Mahmoud and Trebesch, 2010). The large literature in economics on organized crime, such as 
Fiorentini and Peltzman (1995) and Freeman (1999), as well as the growing field of migration 
economics, has notably ignored the market for human trafficking and migrant exploitation 
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(Weitzer, 2015). This results in very little available, reliable knowledge of human trafficking as 
an economic phenomenon and hence reduces the effectiveness of policymaking.  
 
In this paper, I study the relationship between natural disasters and human trafficking. Although 
human trafficking is not as well-studied as the gravity of the problem warrants, there has recently 
been an increase in speculation of the relationship between human trafficking and natural 
disasters (CdeBaca, 2010; Singh, 2012; Childs, 2016). Isolated incidents of disasters in certain 
areas of the world have led people to infer a positive correlation between the two phenomena. 
However, to the best of my knowledge, no rigorous analysis has been conducted on the causal 
effect of natural disasters on human trafficking. Natural disasters have a substantial negative 
economic impact and cause instability in affected countries. As a result, many people are left 
vulnerable and desperate during times of disasters, often seeking migratory alternatives. Children 
are especially vulnerable under these circumstances as they may be separated from their families 
and removed by traffickers (Singh, 2012). It is evident that natural disasters make for a ripe 
environment in which human trafficking can flourish. However, little to no intervention against 
the illicit activity is prioritized in disaster relief efforts.  
 
This paper therefore comes as an attempt to supplement the deficient literature on human 
trafficking as an economic issue and to empirically analyze the causal relationship between 
human trafficking and natural disasters. My paper has the potential to raise awareness and 
provide valuable information to anti-human trafficking and disaster relief organizations. It could 
also influence policymakers as they could obtain further insight into the limited knowledge of 
human trafficking determinants. Prioritization of human trafficking is imperative, especially 
during times of chaos, and a paper of this nature could help reach this goal.  
 
The inspiration for this specific analysis comes from past studies like Akee et al. (2010) that 
investigate the association between trafficking and other exogenous factors such as conflict and 
fragmentation. As one studies the nature of human trafficking, it is evident that it is not often a 
black and white matter. Its aspects are defined by different spectrums that are narrowed down 
through the emergence of new research. Although the relationship between human trafficking 
and natural disasters has only been speculated (CdeBaca, 2010; Singh, 2012; Childs, 2016) yet 
not empirically examined, I a priori expect that natural disasters increase the probability of 
trafficking outflow from the affected country. I also expect the intensity of the disaster to make a 
difference in the prevalence of trafficking with higher intensity resulting in higher trafficking. 
Finally, I examine the economic channels or mechanisms through which disasters affect 
trafficking. I argue that while the effect of disasters on certain economic factors may play a role 
in the increase of trafficking, other traits of disasters also significantly influence the probability 
of trafficking occurrence.    
 
These arguments are based on an interpretation of human trafficking as a spectrum of many 
factors. The later sections thus explain the scope of the problem as an array of conditions and the 
root causes that drive its interconnection with migration and economic patterns. This will then 
transition into an analysis of natural disasters and their potential enhancement of these patterns. 
Examples of the suppositions raised from the occurrence of typhoons, earthquakes, and floods on 
the increased vulnerability of people and poor economic conditions provide qualitative support 
towards the relationship with human trafficking. I hence base my arguments on these 
observations and use it as a firm base for the paper.  
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I use data on 120 countries in the years 2012 and 2011 to estimate the relationship between the 
incidence of natural disasters in a given year, the economic impacts, and the probability of being 
a source trafficking country using an Ordinary Least Squares regression methodology. The key 
results are in line with my expectations. The probability of trafficking increases significantly by 
30.4 percent with the incidence of disaster as well as with the increase in intensity. These results 
are robust to controlling for other relevant socioeconomic characteristics of the country, region, 
and locality. I also find that 4.35 percentage points of the estimated effect of disasters on 
trafficking can be explained by the effect of disasters on GDP, unemployment rate, and trade 
share of GDP. Thus, the remaining 26.1 percent increase in the probability of trafficking are 
likely due to alternate mechanisms of disasters not controlled for.   
 
The final part of my paper offers a conclusion and suggestions for the improvement of future 
research. It also calls policymakers to take action but more especially calls on special 
organizations involved in disaster relief and human trafficking prevention to work in tandem.  
 
2. Human Trafficking: Prevalence and Patterns 
 
2.1 Definitions and History 
 
One of the biggest issues with studying human trafficking is definitional. Various definitions 
exist and each country has its own legal interpretation for it. There is little consensus on its actual 
structure and even less on how it should be measured (McCarthy, 2014; Ali, 2010; Guinn, 2008). 
The number of instances of trafficking that countries report can almost never be compared cross-
nationally and their accuracy is questionable due to misidentification of victims by authorities 
(Laczko, 2007). This, in turn, affects the way that research is done on the topic so it is crucial to 
accurately define the concepts explored in this paper. 
 
The human trafficking definition that is currently internationally accepted and ratified by 117 
countries is derived from the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, also known as the Palermo Protocol. It is defined as:  
 
“the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the 
threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the 
abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or 
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose 
of exploitation,” with exploitation defined widely to include “at a minimum, the exploitation of 
the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery 
or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs” (UN Protocol 2000). 
 
It is important to note that some countries have incorporated extra components to the Palermo 
Protocol’s requirements and that this paper follows the United States’ version of the definition, 
which includes the inducing of any commercial sex act of a minor. Aside from forced 
prostitution and labor, other events that have been classified as human trafficking include organ 
trafficking in Egypt (Budiani-Saberi et al., 2011) and the Balkans (OSCE, 2013) from Sudanese 
refugees, children forced begging in South Eastern European and Asian streets (Cherneva, 2011), 
and Westerners and Thai/Russian women transnational marriages (Tyldum, 2013). The distinct 
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characteristics of these activities manifestly depict the difficulty in drawing clear definitional 
parameters. 
 
Although migrant smuggling,1 forced labor,2 and slavery are all considered distinct crimes under 
international law, it is difficult to separate them from human trafficking due to the several ways 
in which they intertwine and may evolve one into the other. Another slightly larger debate 
revolves around the close connection between prostitution and human trafficking, emerging in 
the early 1900s with the first anti-trafficking movement that concentrated on preventing women 
and girls from being transported abroad for prostitution purposes (Limoncelli, 2010).  
 
As the trafficking issue rose in popularity again in the 1990s, this close connection continued 
amongst activists, influencing new policy decision-making centralized around prostitution. For 
example, the 2000 Trafficking Victims Protection Act focused new domestic law around this 
relationship and made it a standard for other countries to follow. This was done through the TIP 
report that began to be issued annually by the U.S. Department of State and now continues to 
assess each country’s level of compliance with anti-trafficking standards (McCarthy, 2014).  
 
The TIP report has just recently expanded to include other forms of trafficking thanks to newly 
discovered findings and estimates. According to ILO, there are nine times more labor trafficking 
victims than there are sex trafficking ones (ILO, 2005). The methods used to arrive at this ratio 
are not very clear, but the fact that the international market for cheap labor is certainly greater 
than the market for sexual services makes this argument rational. With a greater market for cheap 
labor comes greater demand for trafficking in these areas, so it is not sensible to believe that 
trafficking most predominantly revolves around the sex industry. In spite of this, most media 
reports, policymaking, and law enforcement globally focus on commercial sex markets (Chuang, 
2010; Marchionni, 2012). While it serves to raise awareness, the labor trafficking problem gets 
neglected entirely and policies regarding prostitution, labor, and migration get affected 
respectively.  
 
2.2 Prevalence 
 
These estimates, although cannot be confirmed with certainty due to the crime’s illicit and 
concealed nature, provide a general sense of the problem. Hence, of the aforementioned 21 
million people estimated to be currently exploited, 44 percent have been trafficked either 
internally or internationally while the remaining victims are engaged in forced labor right in their 
place of residence (ILO, 2012). Of the people subjected to forced sexual and labor exploitation, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Migrant smuggling occurs as a result of the smugglee paying the smuggler to facilitate the travel to the 
destination country, thereby both parties violating the law. Any exploitation in the process ends as soon as the 
border is reached, as opposed to trafficking. Realistically, however, at the end of the journey the smugglee is 
usually indebted to his or her smuggler and thus, must continue to pay their debts, often under exploitative 
conditions (Kyle and Koslowski, 2001   
2 The International Labour Organization (ILO) see trafficking victims as being engaged in forced labor, 
defined by the Forced Labour Convention as “all work or service which is exacted from any person under the 
menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.” This definition, 
therefore, does not require any crossing of borders and ignores the distinguishing from smugglees or illegal 
immigrants.  
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98 percent of them are women and 60 percent are men respectively. 93 percent of sexually 
exploited people move internally or internationally while only 33.7 percent of those exploited by 
forced labor, travel.  As of 2007, the profits of all forms of trafficking are estimated at $91.2 
billion worldwide (Kara, 2008). This is greater than the entire economies of Iceland, Moldova, 
Gambia, Honduras, and Liberia combined. Sex trafficking alone is said to amount to $27.8 
billion in profits while labor trafficking produces $3.8 billion (Belser, 2005).  
 
The Eastern European countries Belarus, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine are some of 
the principal source countries of human trafficking (Mahmoud and Trebesch, 2010; ILO, 2005) 
while affluent and proximate Western European countries and Russia seem to be the main 
destinations. Other significant destinations include North America and Asia as well as certain 
countries in the Middle East like Israel, Lebanon, Turkey, and United Arab Emirates (UNODC, 
2006).  
 
The factors dictating whether a country is a source or a destination have been investigated with 
difficulty. Most of the findings indicate that this is largely a function of the country’s economic 
conditions and consequently migration patterns and policies. Akee et al. (2007) find that income 
inequality within a country is a major determinant of out-trafficking. Vulnerable people in poor 
economic conditions seek better opportunities abroad. However, as the supply of legal migration 
and employment is limited, illegal means by which to travel and work abroad become seemingly 
worthwhile. Traffickers and smugglers take advantage of this supply and demand inequality and 
make a profit out of people’s vulnerabilities.  
 
This argument is supported by Mahmoud and Trebesch (2010) as they find that migration 
prevalence, as well as some determinants of migration, are key predictors of trafficking. When 
there is an increase of border restriction, there is also seemingly an increase in the probability of 
the migrant’s victimization. In the same way, illegal migration patterns are indicators of 
trafficking risks. These are substantially lower, however, if human trafficking awareness is high 
in the region. Ignorance and hopefulness thus make people rely on third parties for desperate 
migration attempts, always expecting the best and often encountering the worst.  
 
2.3 Human Trafficking as a Spectrum 
 
The trafficking crime prevails because it is a high-profit, low-risk billion-dollar business. 
Victims usually participate willingly at the early stages, making them easier than arms and drugs 
to transport across borders (McCarthy, 2014). Because of the wide range of opportunities, the 
levels of organization, as well as the number of criminal trafficking groups, vary considerably 
across and within countries (Surtees, 2008).  
 
On the one hand, there exist highly organized trafficking organizations like those found in 
Bulgaria (Petrunov, 2011). Their operations involve people with delegated roles, organized 
payrolls, and detailed bookkeeping methods, much in the same way that a regular business would 
function. These organizations have complete control of the process from source to destination 
country. On the other hand, there are less involved, more open-ended trafficking organizations. 
In a study by Chin and Finckernauer (2011), they find that Chinese women working for the sex 
trade used travel agencies or former prostitutes to facilitate their journey. Once they arrived at 
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their destination, locals assisted them in finding work at brothels and strip clubs. Never was there 
any controlling organizational figure delegating the process at any point.   
 
The recruitment process also occurs on a spectrum and many traffickers approach it an array of 
ways. In order to facilitate the victims’ movement or exploitation, traffickers frequently take 
advantage of corrupt officials (Studnicka, 2010). When recruiting, they may use complete 
deception and force or they may initially have the victim’s complete consent and agreement. For 
example, a study in sex trafficking by Hoyle et al. (2011) showed that in Albania and Bulgaria, 
boyfriends often recruit women while in Southeast Asia, women themselves approach traffickers 
to pay off debts. Other types of recruitment found in the study involved recruitment through 
newspaper ads or by deceiving offers of education abroad. Once in the destinations, traffickers 
use all sorts of physical or psychological procedures, including debt bondage, to keep them 
subjected to work. 
 
The last part of the spectrum describes the victims. In general, migrants are guided by push and 
pull factors. These may be poor economic, working, or home conditions on the push side and 
promises of a “modern,” autonomous life on the pull side (Aronowitz, 2009). Therefore, on the 
one side, a victim may have been kidnapped and forced into confining, dangerous labor, 
deceived about the kind of work they would be doing, or receive little to no pay while 
experiencing physical, sexual, and psychological abuse. On the other side are people who give 
their full consent and suffer no abuse. Some of them are even liberated from oppressive 
conditions at home and enjoy upward mobility in their destination. In between these two sides 
are people who encounter combined experiences. For example, they may not be deceived about 
the type of job but rather about the working conditions or they may not be physically or sexually 
assaulted but are instead subjected to harassment and verbal abuse.  
 
The fact that there are so many different parts to human trafficking, each ranging in variety, is 
yet another issue that researchers, policymakers, and law enforcement face. The ambiguity and 
subjectivity with which trafficking can occur make it difficult to study and to detect. This 
inevitably affects the way that we attempt to eliminate it. 
 
2.4 Policy Adoptions and Implementation 
 
The way in which we understand and interpret human trafficking affect policymaking, both 
regarding human trafficking and factors associated with it such as prostitution, labor and 
migration. A strong focus on sex trafficking has kept the attention concentrated on prostitution 
policy while ignoring the effects of labor and migration policy on trafficked victims. For 
example, Asian women in the Middle East working in the domestic sector have been found tied 
to their employers due to the ‘Kefala’ migration sponsorship system. The national labor law does 
not protect these workers. In addition, in the case of conflict, employers have the right to revoke 
their work permits if the employees do not comply, often leading to exploitative situations 
(Mahdavi, 2013). Another study showed that people are trafficked into forced labor where the 
labor markets are poorly regulated, increasing their vulnerability to exploitation (Anderson and 
O’Connell Davidson, 2003). Because migration and labor issues have a clear effect on human 
trafficking, neglecting their importance thus affects the efficacy of actual human trafficking 
policy.  
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Recently, there has been an increase in the effort to combat human trafficking by international 
organizations, national governments worldwide and NGOs. In 2007, the UN launched the Global 
Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking after the issuing of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons (UN, 2000a) in 2004 and the Protocol Against the Smuggling of 
Migrants (UN, 2000b) in 2003. The European Union and the U.S. government have also 
augmented the anti-trafficking funding (Mahmoud and Trebesch 2010).  
 
Different studies have found patterns in the behavior of countries regarding trafficking policy 
adoption. The pressure that the U.S. TIP report has applied on countries has helped drive the 
spread of anti-trafficking policies worldwide (Gallagher, 2011). This, in turn, affects the 
cumulative behavior of neighboring countries. Lloyd et al. (2011) find that states are more likely 
to criminalize trafficking if their neighbors do out of worry that not doing so will force 
trafficking over the borders into their countries. Developed countries have shown the most 
interest and commitment in passing anti-trafficking policies while regions like South Asia and 
the Middle East have shown less and even a decreasing collaboration (Cho et al., 2014).  
 
One can say that anti-trafficking policy adoption has been a relative success. As of 2013, 182 
countries have criminalized or partially criminalized human trafficking (Protection Project, 
2013). However, its implementation seems to be a much more difficult task. In 2013, the total 
number of human trafficking prosecutions and convictions reported globally was only 9,460 and 
5,776 respectively (US Department of State, 2014). This is because an effective response to 
trafficking from the criminal justice system warrants a substantial amount of government 
resources in order to successfully interdict the criminals and provide support for the victims so 
that they can be a part of the investigation (Gallagher and Holmes, 2008). Since the nature of the 
crime is still under a lot of speculation and much remains ambiguous, authorities believe 
implementation to be too difficult and likely a waste of resources (McCarthy, 2014).  
 
First, not only does the array of different kinds of victims make it difficult to identify them, but 
they may also be severely traumatized and refuse to participate in the investigation or cooperate 
with authorities (Oram et al., 2012). Even in the United States that has invested a lot of resources 
to the anti-trafficking cause, many law enforcement officials do not believe that human 
trafficking exists in their area and remain unprepared to identify and respond to a trafficking case 
(Farrell et al., 2012). To make matters worse, if a trafficking case is identified and prosecuted 
correctly, it may not be pursued under the adopted trafficking laws, as they are largely untested 
and thus difficult to interpret. These cases then do not get reported as trafficking, hindering the 
accuracy of future research. Yet, there has still been notable progress in the adoption and 
implementation of human trafficking relative to previous years and with the continuation of 
research, this process can only improve.  
 
2.5 Natural Disasters and Human Trafficking 
 
As previously mentioned, people’s vulnerability, poor economic conditions, and desire to 
migrate significantly affect the prevalence of trafficking. When exogenous factors like natural 
disasters strike, these circumstances are likely to heighten and are only made worse by the chaos 
inherent to disasters.   
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In the last few years, there has been some speculation regarding the relationship between natural 
disasters and human trafficking. For example in 2013, Typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines, 
leaving approximately 10,000 dead and 600,000 homeless within a week. Even prior to the 
typhoon, Filipinos have found themselves in vulnerable economic positions with 47.5 percent of 
them living on less than $2 per day. One in ten people thus find work abroad, many under 
exploitative conditions (Calkins, 2013). Due to the economic turmoil, widespread instability, and 
the severity of deaths and infrastructure, Haiyan was expected to have risen trafficking by a 
significant amount, especially that of children. Britain’s International development secretary, 
Justine Greening said: “after previous emergencies in the Philippines, we have seen an increase 
in the violence against women and girls and in particular the trafficking of girls.” 
 
Similar patterns have been recognized in other countries enduring different disasters. The 
Pakistan floods in 2010 left the country one fifth underwater and crippling in poverty, allegedly 
increasing trafficking outflow. In the same year, the earthquake in Haiti also created appalling 
economic conditions. With the loosening of borders to allow aid flow and too many Haitian 
children already in forced labor, the earthquake only made Haiti even more susceptible to further 
exploitative conditions. Even the drought of 2011 in Africa saw families marrying off their 
daughters (often as young as nine years old) to pay their dowries before their livestock died 
(Calkins, 2013).  
 
Children seem to be the most affected during times of natural disasters. Najat Maalla M’jid, the 
UN Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, child pornography and prostitution warned, 
“Children’s vulnerability is significantly increased when they are separated from their families, 
unaccompanied, orphaned or displaced following a humanitarian crisis.” As the report at the 19th 
Session of the Human Rights Council explained, some people take advantage of the unstable 
environment created by disasters to exploit children. This environment may cause a collapse of a 
strong State system that enables traffickers to bypass established standards and take children 
elsewhere, especially when they have been separated from their families. 
 
Regardless of the clear patterns seen during natural disasters, human trafficking intervention is 
not prioritized in disaster relief efforts, especially child protection. Misty Buswell, the Deputy 
head of Office, Child Protection Initiative, Save the Children, noted that disaster relief responses 
usually concentrate on food. However, other tragedies like droughts cause displacement and 
increase vulnerability in such a way that it requires better protection and funding mechanisms. 
Currently, the lowest funded sector is protection and lowest within that sector is child protection 
(Singh, 2012).  
 
Although scarce, there have been some efforts to address this issue. For instance, the U.S. 
Department of State has called for anti-trafficking measures during humanitarian aid settings. 
Also, programs such as the JTI Foundation pilot program seek to increase the evidence of the 
relationship between the frequency and intensity of natural disasters and a rise in human 
trafficking. This foundation emphasizes the importance of preventing forced migration through 
the establishment of a hazards and vulnerabilities database and the development of Community-
Based Disaster Risk Reduction strategies. Awareness of this relationship is improving but as 
Harvard’s Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research has stated, a stronger 
international response to human trafficking during complex emergencies is crucially necessary. 
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3. Data 
 
The panel data used in this paper was collected from various sources and spans 120 countries and 
the years 2011 to 2012. Table 1 describes the variables used in my analysis.  
 
I use three key measures in my analysis. The first measures trafficking and is based on the 
Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report (US Department of State 2013) that compiles descriptive 
accounts of trafficking incidences per country for the year 2012. The source-destination pairs are 
coded from the individual country reports. A 1 is awarded if the report mentioned the occurrence 
of trafficking from the source country to the destination country and a 0 otherwise (Akee et al., 
2010). Map 1 shows the countries color-coded according to their categorization as a source, 
destination, both or transit/none. Only the color filled countries are taken into account. As the 
map shows, most countries are likely to be both source and destination. Out of the 120 countries, 
79 fall under this category including large countries like the United States, Canada, Brazil, 
Russia, and China as well as smaller countries like Liberia, Lithuania, Haiti, and Nepal. Very 
few are considered strictly source or strictly destination. There are 22 source countries, which are 
mainly spread out through Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia and 18 destination 
countries, which are concentrated in Europe with the exception of several countries like 
Australia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, and Gabon. Only Algeria is considered a transit country, 
neither destination nor source in my study.  
 
Secondly, I measure disasters and obtain the data from the Emergency Events Database (EM-
DAT). The disasters recorded are earthquakes, droughts, floods, storms, landslides, and extreme 
temperatures. If any disaster is reported for the given year in the country, it is coded as 1 and 0 
otherwise. To capture the effect of the intensity of the disaster on human trafficking, I collect 
data on the total number of deaths, the number of injured, and the number of people left 
homeless due to any of the disasters mentioned for the year 2012. I also collect a cumulative 
measure of the total number of people affected for the years 2012 and 2011 in order to capture 
the impact of the disaster intensity over time.  
 
Finally, since most of the literature on human trafficking and migration finds that relatively 
poorer countries are more likely to be source countries while richer countries tend to be 
destination countries (Akee et al., 2010; Cho et al., 2015; Danailova-Trainor and Belser, 2006; 
Mahmoud and Trebesch 2010; Bruckert and Parent, 2002), Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita is included and collected from the World Bank Development indicators for the year 2012.  
 
I follow prior literature and control for the following variables in my regression analysis. First, I 
use a distance variable that measures the simple distance per 1,000 km between the source and 
destination countries’ most populated cities. It is obtained from the CEPII GeoDist dataset 
(2011) and it is used to monitor the effect of the distance traveled.  Next, the indicator variable 
landlocked dummy is included to account for the ease with which trafficked victims can move 
from source to destination countries. It takes a value of 1 if a country is landlocked and 0 
otherwise. Other variables include population, the sum of exports and imports (trade) as a share 
of GDP, unemployment rate, the share of people that are aged 65 or above, infant mortality, and 
continent/region categorical variables. They are also collected from the World Bank 
Development Indicators for the year 2012.  
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The nature of governance is captured through four different indices: voice and accountability, 
political stability and absence of violence, the rule of law, and control of corruption. The voice 
and accountability index variable measures the extent to which people believe they have voting 
rights, freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of media. Political stability 
captures perceptions of the probability of instability and/or violence motivated by any political 
party, including terrorism. Rule of law reflects people’s confidence in the rules of society and the 
quality of contract enforcement, police, property rights, the courts, and police as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. Finally, the control of corruption variable demonstrates the 
perceptions of the strength of public power for private gain and control of the state by elites and 
private interests.  These indices range from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance. 
Kauffman, Kray, and Mastruzzi collected the data through the Worldwide Governance Indicators  
(WGI) project (2015) for the year 2012. These variables are included due to the effect of the 
quality of governance on both GDP and human trafficking as found by previous literature (Cho 
et al., 2015; Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer, 2012; Akee et al. 2012). 
 
Finally, gender equality is captured through the Global Gender Gap Index Report 2013 (World 
Economic Forum). It examines four areas of gender inequality: economic participation and 
opportunity, educational attainment, political empowerment, and health and survival in which 
each country is given a score per area of inequality and then combined to form a final gender gap 
score. The score ranges between 0 and 1, 1 pertaining to having the most equality. This factor is 
important to determine a country’s level of trafficking since studies have found very mixed 
results on the matter (Bettio and Nandi, 2010; Di Tommaso et al., 2009; Rao and Presenti, 2012; 
Clawson and Layne, 2007; Cho et al. 2015). 
 
Table 2 presents the country-level summary statistics while Table 3 provides the summary 
statistics of the estimation sample, which is at the country-year level. It is important to note the 
mean of the trafficking dummy in Table 3 as it suggests that there is a 4.6 percent level of 
trafficking outflow. This will become critical when determining the relative effect of the 
independent variables on the level of trafficking. The average number of the probability of 
disaster occurrence is greater for the year 2012 (0.723) than it is for 2011 (0.583) yet there is a 
greater average number of people affected in 2011 (1.702) than in 2012 (0.839). This suggests 
that although fewer disasters occurred in 2011, their intensities were potentially of greater 
magnitude. The averages of total deaths, total injured, and total homeless increase respectively, 
with deaths being the lowest (0.008) and homeless being the highest (0.622). The summary 
statistics of the governance factors indicate that on average countries lie on the negative (weaker) 
score. However, the gender gap score average is well over 50 percent, indicating that there is 
relatively a larger worldwide equality between males and females. Finally, Table 4 lists all 
countries used in this paper, grouped by continent/region.  
 
4. Empirical Methodology  
 
To determine any possible link between natural disasters and human trafficking, I first estimate 
the overall effect of disaster occurrence in a country on trafficking from that country after 
controlling for other variables described in the previous section. To do this, I run two sets of 
regressions that estimate the effect of i) the incidence of disaster indicator variable on trafficking, 
and ii) the intensity of disasters on trafficking. The first model used is presented below: 
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𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔!" =   𝛼! +   𝛽!𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡! + 𝛽!𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠! + 𝛽!𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠! + 𝜀!"                               (1) 
  
where traffickingij is the binary dependent variable for the incidence of trafficking from source 
country i to destination country j in year the 2012. The variable takes a value of 1 if an incidence 
of trafficking has been reported and 0 otherwise. This method of source-destination pairing was 
suggested by Akee et al. (2010).  
 
The variable disasterti takes a value of the incidence of disasters in either 2012 or in 2011 in two 
separate regression variants. It is the primary binary independent variable coded as 1 if a disaster 
occurred in the given year in the source country and 0 otherwise.  
 
Controls are the rest of the variables that take into account the source country’s location, as well 
as its health, social, and governance status. These include the share of people that are aged 65 or 
above, infant mortality, the distance between countries and landlocked and continent/region 
categorical variables. It also includes the four indices representing the nature of the country’s 
governance such as voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, the rule 
of law, and control of corruption, as well as the country’s gender equality variable, the gender 
gap index. The same controls are included for the destination countries.  
 
The second model finds the effect of the intensity of disasters on trafficking as follows: 
 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔!" =   𝛼! +   𝛽!𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦! + 𝛽!𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠! + 𝛽!𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠! + 𝜀!!                               (2) 
 
where all the variables remain the same as previously described except for intensityi. This 
independent variable takes a different form in three different regression variants. The first variant 
divides the variable into three distinct ones: total deaths, total injured, and total homeless for the 
year 2012. This is done in order to capture each of their effects on trafficking and to determine if 
there is a difference in effect depending on the level of harm to the populous.  
 
The second and third variants are represented by a total affected cumulative variable for the year 
2012 and 2011 respectively. They are introduced in two different regressions and seek to capture 
the effect of the collective intensity over time. The controls in all three variants include the 
economic factors GDP, unemployment rate, and trade share of GDP as well as the rest of the 
control variables previously mentioned. 
 
Next, I try to understand the channels through which disaster impacts trafficking. Specifically, I 
test if the relationship between trafficking and disasters can be explained by the effect of the 
disaster on the country’s economic outcomes. To do this, I first estimate the effect of the 
incidence of disaster on the economic factors GDP, unemployment rate, and trade share of GDP 
and then examine if the previously estimated relationship between disaster and trafficking 
changes when I control for these measures of a country’s economic status. 
 
To capture the effect of natural disasters on GDP I estimate the following regression: 
 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠! =   𝛼! + 𝛽!𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡! + 𝛽!𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠! + 𝜀!                                                          (3) 
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where EconFactorsi is the dependent variable and takes the value of either GDP, unemployment 
rate, or trade share of GDP for country i on three separate regression variants. The variable 
disasterti represents the same disaster independent variables as mentioned before for the years 
2012 and 2011 in another two separate variants per regression. The controls also remain the same 
as previously mentioned. Only the source countries are used for this model, lowering the 
observations to 120 or less. Although the small number of observations may decrease the 
coefficients’ statistical significance, it may still provide an insight into the disasters direct effect 
on GDP and hence, their indirect effect on trafficking.  
 
I estimate four specifications for each variant of the regression models. The first specification 
excludes all control variables, leaving only the dependent variable and the key independent 
variable of interest (disasterti or intensityi). The subsequent three specifications gradually 
accumulate regressors until they are all incorporated. Like this, I am able to determine the effect 
that certain control variables may have on the main explanatory variable and how significance 
varies accordingly. The coefficients of these main explanatory variables give a causal estimate of 
the effect rather than just the degree of correlation. This is because disaster occurrence, such as 
that of an earthquake or storm, is likely to be exogenous and unrelated to other factors that affect 
trafficking directly.   
 
5. Results 
 
Trafficking-Disaster Incidence 
 
Table 5 shows the results of the first regression model, each panel representing a separate 
regression variant and each column referring to the different specifications. The first 
specification of each variant regresses trafficking on the incidence of disaster in the year 2012 or 
2011 as seen in Column 1. The second specification includes general control variables for the 
source and destination countries such as the distance between them, health factors, population, 
and landlocked effects. The third specification controls for social and quality of governance 
conditions while the fourth specification controls for regional fixed effects.  
 
As seen in Panel A, the estimates of the main variables of interest show that the incidence of 
disaster in the year 2012 is statistically significant and positively affects trafficking flows 
regardless of the specification.  Panel B also shows very similar results for the incidence of 
disaster in the year 2011 except the lack of statistical significance for the fourth specification. 
 
Focusing on Panel A, it is evident that although the magnitude of the coefficient decreases with 
the inclusion of control variables, the positive link remains across the board. Compared to the 
fourth specification (Column 4), the third specification excluding the regional fixed effects 
shows a larger coefficient magnitude of 2.3 percent. Relative to the mean for the trafficking 
variable (4.6 percent as seen in Table 2), an increase of 2.3 percentage points translates into a 50 
percent increase in trafficking. The fourth specification including all control variables 
demonstrates that the incidence of disasters in the year 2012 increases the probability of the 
country being a trafficking source by 1.4 percentage points at a 5 percent significance level. 
Once again comparing to the mean trafficking level, this increase of 1.4 percentage points would 
mean an overall increase in trafficking of 30.4 percent, still a substantial effect.  
 
	   14	  
Panel B shows the same specification patterns for the incidence of disasters in the year 2011 (one 
year prior the trafficking reports). This key variable is included in order to determine whether the 
incidence of disasters in the past affect trafficking flows in the future. The estimates show a 
constant positive link across the specifications with only the fourth one being a negative 
coefficient and lacking statistical significance. Nevertheless, they show that an increase in the 
incidence of disaster in the year 2011 increases the probability of trafficking in 2012 by 1.5 
percentage points (a 32.6 percent increase) at a 1 percent significance level without taking into 
account the regional fixed effects (Column 3). Though Column 4 results in a very small, 
insignificant coefficient, the previous specifications of the regression demonstrate trends that a 
disaster in the previous year may positively and significantly affect trafficking in the upcoming 
year.  
 
Table 5 thus confirms my hypothesis as it explicitly demonstrates the positive significant 
correlation between disasters (in the same and previous year of occurrence) and the probability 
of trafficking outflow from the disaster-affected country.   
 
Trafficking-Disaster Intensity 
 
Table 6 depicts the results of the second regression model with the same specification patterns as 
aforementioned and the three disaster intensity variants represented per panel: A) total deaths, 
injured, and homeless B) total affected in the year 2012 C) total affected in the year 2011. The 
first variant attempts to capture the effects of each level of harm on trafficking while the last two 
seek to capture the effect of the passage of time, much in the same way as the disaster variables 
did in the first model. The controls used remain the same as the first model with the exception 
that the second specification includes the economic factors GDP, unemployment rate, and trade 
share of GDP.  
 
Like in the first regression model, the inclusion of further controls either decreases the 
magnitude of the coefficients or maintains them the same. Significance at the 1 percent level is 
preserved throughout the table, indicating a clear correlation between the intensity variables and 
trafficking regardless of the specification.  
 
The first variant results in positive and significant coefficients for total deaths, injured and 
homeless. The coefficients for total deaths vary and decrease with the addition of further 
regressors while the coefficients for total injured follow a similar pattern with the exception of 
Column 2 and remain relatively more stable. The estimates for total homeless remain essentially 
the same regardless of the specification. The coefficients’ magnitudes also seem to decrease 
parallel to the level of physical harm done to the population. While the coefficients of total 
deaths (greatest physical harm) are a lot larger than the coefficients of total injured, both of their 
coefficients are in turn a lot greater than the coefficients of total homeless (lowest physical 
harm). As can be seen by Column 4, an increase of 10,000 deaths increases the probability of 
trafficking by 33.9 percentage points and an increase in the same amount of people injured 
increases trafficking by just 3.4 percentage points. To a much lesser degree, an increase of 
10,000 homeless increases trafficking by only .4 percentage points. These differences between 
the variable coefficients insinuate that as the severity of the disaster increases, so does the 
probability of trafficking outflow.   
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The second and third variants resulted in positive and significant results in all four specifications. 
The magnitudes of the coefficients do not vary much, although the total affected in 2012 has a 
larger impact on trafficking than the total affected in 2011, as expected. Regardless, the number 
of people affected does have an impact on the likelihood of trafficking for the current and 
previous year, as small as that effect may be. As can be seen from the table, an increase of a 
million people affected in 2012 increases the probability of trafficking outflow in the same year 
by .5 percentage points while an equal increase in 2011 increases trafficking in 2012 by .1 
percentage points. These findings show that the impact of disaster intensity carries over to the 
following year and may indeed contribute to an increase in trafficking levels.  
 
GDP-Disasters 
 
Finally, Table 7 shows the results of the third model that follows the same specification patterns 
as before but instead focuses solely on source countries. Due to this, the number of observations 
decreases and may have been the cause for the drop in significance. Nonetheless, this model is 
used to determine any economic mechanisms through which disasters affect trafficking. The 
three economic factors incorporated as separate dependent variables are GDP, unemployment 
rate, and trade share of GDP. The main explanatory variables are incidence in disaster in the year 
2012 and 2011, introduced separately in two different regression variants. Overall, the 
coefficients for disastert all turn out negative for each of the three dependent variable variants. 
Significance varies greatly across the table.   
 
In the first section where GDP is the dependent variable, only the coefficient in the second 
specification (Column 2) turns out to be statistically significant at the 1 percent level and greater 
in magnitude than the rest. The variant including disasters in 2011 shows that specification 2 is 
once again the only one that provides a significant result but to a much lesser significance level. 
The coefficients’ negative sign is expected, as an increase in disasters in 2012 should decrease 
the country’s GDP for the same year. However, the signs for disasters in 2011 result positive 
after the first specification. This means that if there is a disaster in 2011, the country’s GDP is 
likely to be higher than if no disaster occurred. An explanation for this may be that countries that 
endure disasters may receive large amounts of aid from foreign countries that could benefit the 
economy and indirectly increase GDP. Also, depending on the country and the efficiency with 
which they react to the situation, a disaster may mean a period of increase spending for 
rebuilding and recovery and thus a fiscal expansion (Kliesen, 1994). Studies on places that have 
endured disasters, i.e. hurricanes, earthquakes, and tsunamis, have found that after the immediate 
loss period, certain economies may enjoy a temporary boost through an increase of outcome, 
employment and innovation (Bennet, 2008; Baily, 2011). However, since I do not include 
information on the change of GDP from 2011 to 2012, the effect that disasters in 2011 may have 
had on that change is not clear, therefore possibly skewing my results as well.  
 
The second section employs trade share of GDP as the dependent variable. The coefficients for 
disasters in 2012 and in 2011 all decrease in magnitude and significance with the addition of 
regressors. Only the coefficients for disaster12 turn out to be significant in every specification. 
Nevertheless, it demonstrates that the incidence of disasters in 2012 decreases the level of trade 
for the same year with a significance level of 10 percent. Disaster11 shows the same results up 
until the third specification. These findings appear sensible as the economy may slow down 
during a disaster, hindering international transactions as well. Furthermore, the effect of disasters 
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on economic conditions seems to be strong enough to roll over for the following year as depicted 
by the significance of disaster11’s coefficients.  
 
The third, and final, section uses unemployment rate as the dependent variable. Only the 
coefficients of the third and fourth specification for disasters in 2012 result significant at the 5 
and 10 percent level respectively. Their negative sign demonstrates that an incidence of disaster 
is likely to decrease the unemployment rate. This could be explained by the definition of 
employment. Since unemployment rate only takes into account people in the labor force, those 
that have given up searching for work after a disaster are not counted as being part of the labor 
force and thus are not considered unemployed. It may also be the case that employment actually 
does increase briefly after a disaster while the country is going through the recovery period. As 
mentioned before, a country’s rebuilding activity usually generates “increased sales tax receipts 
and additional employment” (Kliesen, 1994). It can very well be the case that for a short period, 
unemployment decreases as the country seeks labor to restore itself.  
 
While significance levels vary throughout the board, it nevertheless shows that there may be a 
significant, negative correlation between disasters and economic factors. Naturally it makes 
sense to believe that with the incidence of disaster comes an inevitable impact on the country’s 
economy, primarily due to disasters’ unexpected nature. Therefore, I am interested in identifying 
the disasters’ mechanism on trafficking by quantifying how much of the disasters’ effect on 
trafficking is due to their effect on economic factors versus how much of it is due to the 
disasters’ inherent characteristics and inevitable consequences on society and the community. In 
order to do this, I run regression (1) once again, this time including the economic controls and 
only using the disaster variable for the year 2012 as the key independent variable. The results are 
in the following section.  
 
Trafficking-Disaster Incidence and Economic Factors  
 
Table 8 shows the results for the first regression model with the integration of the economic 
factors previously omitted. As can be seen on the table, the coefficients for disaster incidence in 
2012 follow the same trends as disaster12 in Table 5: the magnitudes of the disaster coefficients 
also decrease with each new set of regressors added and the significance levels remain exactly 
the same per specification. The only difference between the results is the fact that the magnitudes 
of the coefficients in Table 8 are much lower than those in Table 5. This confirms the existence 
of disasters’ economic mechanism. However, because the coefficients do not turn into zeros and 
are still very much significant, it also proves the existence of other mechanisms. The difference 
between the coefficient magnitudes in Column 4 for Table 5 and Table 8 is 0.002. This means 
that only 0.2 percent accounts for disasters’ mechanism through GDP, unemployment rate, and 
trade share of GDP. Since the disaster coefficient is 0.012 and significant at the 5 percent 
significance level when accounting for the economic factors, I infer that 1.2 percent hence 
encompasses the impact of other disaster mechanisms affected by alternate factors not controlled 
for; potentially through the creation of instability and tumultuous conditions or their effect on 
other economic factors. This regression shows that the incidence of disasters in the year 2012 
increases the probability of the country being a trafficking source by 1.2 percentage points, a 
26.1 percent increase in the overall probability of trafficking outflow. Comparing it to the 30.4 
percent increase previously established using Table 5, one can conclude that the difference of 4.3 
percent is caused solely by disaster’s economic mechanism on trafficking.   
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The coefficients for the remaining control variables are also interesting to analyze. They 
corroborate several results from the literature and provide additional information that may be 
beneficial for future research.  
 
As expected, the coefficient for the distance variable indicates that it is negative and significant 
at the 1 percent significance level. A decrease of 1,000 km results in an increase of 1.1 
percentage points of trafficking. This is in accord with migration literature and makes sense due 
to the close connection between migration and human trafficking. Previous studies find that 
trafficking and migration lie on a spectrum and may go hand in hand. Mahmoud and Trebesch 
(2010) conclude that an increase of migration prevalence translates into a substantial increase in 
the predicted probability of human trafficking. A shorter distance between source and destination 
countries may contribute to several migration patterns and thus to the increase of trafficking.  
 
GDP per capita also results as expected, having coefficients of equal magnitudes but of opposite 
signs for the source and destination countries with a 1 percent significance level. An increase of 
$10,000 of GDP per capita in a source country decreases the trafficking outflow by 1.4 
percentage points. The same increase in the GDP per capita in a destination country increases 
that country’s trafficking inflow by the same percentage. This is in line with the migration and 
human trafficking literature as previous studies record similar effects (Cho et al., 2015; Akee et 
al., 2010, 2012, 2014; Bettio and Nandi, 2010; Danailova-Trainor and Belser, 2006; Di 
Tommaso et al., 2009; Frank, 2011; Jac-Kucharski, 2012; Rao and Presenti, 2012). The fact that 
the effect of GDP per capita reflects a significant impact of income on both the source and 
destination countries suggests that trafficking is largely a phenomenon related to economic 
migration.  
 
Subsequently, the landlocked dummy and the trade share of GDP variable give an insight on the 
effect of a country’s openness on trafficking. The landlocked dummy coefficient proves to be 
negative and significant for both the source and destination countries. Not being landlocked 
increases the likelihood of being a source country by 1.5 percentage points and a destination 
country by 1.9 percentage points. This is inline with Akee et al. (2010, 2012, 2014) as they 
suggest that this is due to the access to seaports and thus the wider spectrum of countries from 
which traffickers can import victims.  
 
The variable for the trade share of GDP is slightly more complicated. The coefficients for the 
source and destination countries are both significant and of equal magnitude, differing only in 
the sign as one is positive and the other negative respectively. This means that an increase in the 
trade percentage of GDP in a source country increases the probability of outflow but the same 
increase in a destination country lowers the probability of inflow. The source results are sensible 
since more trade suggests more openness and involvement with foreign relations, which could 
help with the trade of humans as commodities as well. From a destination perspective, however, 
a negative coefficient is not as reasonable and contradicts previous studies (Cho, 2013; 
Danailova-Trainor and Belser, 2006) that find the coefficient either insignificant or positive. One 
explanation could be that destination countries that have a high share of trade may also be 
countries that have stronger regulations because of the heavy volume of imports and exports that 
they handle. Regardless, a closer look at the effect of trade is warranted in order to make more 
accurate conclusions.  
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The population estimates result as expected but had little importance on their impact. The source 
country’s population variable is positive and significant at the 1 percent significance level but the 
magnitude is infinitesimal.  An increase of one million people only increases the probability of 
trafficking by 0.1 percentage point. The destination country’s population coefficient is even 
smaller than that and a lot less significant. There is plenty of literature that concurs with these 
findings (Danailova-Trainor and Belser, 2006; Frank, 2011; Mo, 2011; Rao and Presenti, 2012; 
Cho et al., 2015), having positive correlate results but trivial in magnitude.  
 
The effect of unemployment rate proves to be significant only for the source country and in an 
unanticipated way. It is negative and significant, as an increase of 1 percentage point of 
unemployment leads to a decrease of 0.3 percentage points of trafficking outflow. Past literature 
finds mixed results on the sign of the coefficient (Clawson and Layne, 2007; Jac-Kucharski, 
2012), positive and negative respectively. These inconsistencies may be due to the subjectivity of 
official measurements of the unemployment rate that could vary per country and might classify 
different types of people as unemployed. Many of these rates can be undervalued, producing 
ambiguous results in the research.  
 
The country health measures also seem to contradict one another. While the coefficient for the 
share of the population of age 65 or above are of equal magnitudes and have opposite signs for 
the source and destination countries (positive and negative respectively), their interpretations are 
counterintuitive. Significantly, an increase of 1 percentage point in the share of people 65 or 
above in a source country increases trafficking outflow by .2 percentage points. This could be 
explained by the notion that having an older population may mean that they are also less 
productive, potentially decreasing economic opportunities. The infant mortality variable only 
results negative and significant for the destination countries, as a decrease in dead infants would 
increase trafficking inflow into those countries. This is rational since it indicates a high level of 
resources available in the country that would make it a more desirable as a destination.  
 
However, the literature seems to disagree with my findings. Where I find the source country 
infant mortality variable to be positive and insignificant, studies like Cho et al. (2015) and 
Mahmoud and Trebesch (2010) find it negative and significant but small in magnitudes. For 
destination countries, Bales (2007) finds it insignificant where I find it positive and significant. 
The differences in findings for both of these health factors as well as their disparity with past 
studies indicate that they are not very prominent and consistent when determining its effect on 
trafficking. There are clearly many other factors influencing the health of a country that may be 
indirectly affecting the levels of trafficking as well.   
 
Furthermore, the governance and social factors are of keen interest as they reveal interesting 
trends about trafficking patterns. The perceived political stability of a source and destination 
country proves to be negative and significant, implying that the more politically stable a country 
is, the less likely trafficking flows are to occur in a country. This is in accordance with previous 
studies like Akee et al. (2014). As Cho et al. (2015) also finds, the perceived rule of law proves 
to be negative and significant at the 10 percent significance level for the source country. For the 
destination country, however, it results positive and significant at the 1 percent significance 
level, contradicting previous studies that find it insignificant or negative (Akee et al., 2010, 2012, 
2014; Cho et al., 2013; Jakobsson and Kotsadam, 2013). The control of corruption proves to be 
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negatively correlated and significant exclusively in the destination countries. This makes sense 
as an increase in control of corruption should decrease trafficking inflow and the results match 
those of Bales (2007) and Cho (2013). The fact that the coefficient is insignificant for the source 
countries is no surprise as previous literature has found it to be insignificant and pertaining to 
mixed results as well (Bales, 2007; Jac-Kucharski, 2012; Mahmoud and Trebesch, 2010; Rao 
and Presenti, 2012).  
 
Of greater interest are the results of the voice and accountability and gender gap variables. Their 
coefficients for the source country are both positive and significant at the 1 percent significance 
level. This means that the more freedom of expression, association and media as well as the 
lower difference in inequality between males and females in a country, the more likely the 
country is to participate as a source of trafficking. The coefficients of the gender gap variable are 
of particular interest because of their great magnitude. They are the largest coefficients of the 
regression model and are positive and negative respectively for the source and destination 
countries. Such significant, large estimates are important because they help clarify the past 
ambiguous results.  
 
Previous literature looks at the effect of many gender-related indicators such as women’s 
education and employment as well as women’s economic and social rights. The results range in 
significance as well as in coefficient signs (Danailova-Trainor and Belser, 2006; Clawson and 
Layne, 2007; Bettio and Nandi, 2010; Di Tommaso et al., 2009; Rao and Presenti, 2012). 
However, this variety indicates that the effect of gender disparities do not have the clear-cut 
effect on trafficking that is intuitively expected. As Cho et al. (2015) suggests, and as my results 
confirm, gender discrimination may not necessarily increase trafficking but may rather hinder it. 
Many of the major source countries are not always the most oppressive towards women while 
their female education and labor participation are not often very low. The rationale is that 
countries with higher women oppression may actually constrain women mobility. This is 
supported by the results in Cho et al. (2015) on the effects of the share of Muslims in a 
population. Islamic countries tend to have low female economic participation and highly 
conservative views on women (Cooray and Potrafke, 2011). As a result, it becomes a lot more 
difficult for women to travel on their own, decreasing the ease with which trafficking may occur.  
 
Similarly, the entire population of countries with lower voice and accountability has many of the 
same restrictions that women endure in female oppressive countries. While the gender gap 
variable can explain why countries with more female discrimination tend to engage in less 
female trafficking, the voice and accountability variable indicates the same trends for both male 
and female victims. Although Akee et al. (2014) suggest voice and accountability to be 
insignificant, my results demonstrate otherwise and serve to support the positive phenomenon of 
gender discrimination on trafficking as well.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Natural disasters and human trafficking have recently been associated with being positively 
correlated one with the other. These assertions are mostly based solely on conjecture and thus, 
little to no prioritization and attention has been awarded to human trafficking during times of 
complex emergencies. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to explore and find a 
quantitative relationship between the two phenomena. Although natural disasters cannot be 
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prevented, a study of this kind may help raise awareness of the seriousness of the human 
trafficking problem during these times. It reinforces the speculations made by people who help 
combat human trafficking and provide new, concrete information to organizations that assist 
countries in states of emergency.  
 
My findings show that disasters in source countries positively correlate with trafficking outflows 
and their effects have an impact over time. The intensity of the disasters is also positively 
correlated; an increase in the gravity of the physical harm caused by disasters increases the 
likelihood of the country being a source of trafficking victims. This effect also carries over time, 
but in a more trivial and less obvious manner. Finally, disasters have a clear mechanism affecting 
trafficking through their impact on GDP, unemployment rate, and trade share of GDP that is 
separate and distinct from alternate mechanisms not controlled for.  
 
In addition to investigating the effect of natural disasters on trafficking, this paper seeks to 
corroborate the effect of other factors mentioned in the literature. I find that gender differences in 
society are by far the strongest factor in magnitude to affect trafficking. It shows that the more 
gender difference that exists in a country, the less likely it is to engage as a source for trafficking. 
Because of its strong significance, this finding is important as it helps guide the mixed results in 
literature in a certain direction. The other variables that I used as controls showed that certain 
geographic, economic, and governance factors are important in determining the likelihood of 
trafficking flows whereas health, unemployment and population factors are not as significant.  
 
My results lie on a range of agreements and disagreements with the literature. As mentioned by 
Weitzer (2015), empirical findings on human trafficking can only serve as estimates and can 
never be fully confirmed due to the crime’s illicit nature. Thus, this paper does not claim to 
provide the exact magnitudes of the effects of the factors investigated or their final role as a 
determinant of human trafficking. Instead, this paper acknowledges the complexity of the 
problem and only seeks to add to the literature so as to help continue the fight against human 
trafficking.  
 
In order to improve the study, other factors such as the legalization of prostitution, internal and 
external conflicts, and a distinction between male and female statistics should be incorporated as 
they have proven to be significant in the past. Also, as suggested by the literature, a longitudinal, 
microanalysis might result in more accurate, representative estimates that could assist in 
particular policy-making and authority strategies. Further studies are always needed when 
dealing with a subject of clandestine nature. However, my findings have the potential to serve as 
a base for such further studies and provide a quantitative verification of the gravity of the 
situation.     
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Table 1: Variable Description
Human Trafficking 
Trafficking 
Disasters
Disaster12
Disaster11
Intensity
Total Deaths12
Total Injured12
Total Homeless12
Total Affected12
Total Affected11
Controls
Source-Destination Distance
GDP
Landlocked dummy
Population
Trade
Unemployment rate 
Population ages 65 or above
Infant Mortality 
Voice and Accountability
Political stability 
Rule of law
Control of corruption
Global Gender Gap 
Continent/region dummy
Total number of people affected by natural disasters in 2012 per 1,000,000 
affected
Total number of people affected by natural disasters in 2011 per 1,000,000 
affected
GDP per capita per $10,000
Note: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption indices range from -2.5 
(weakest) to 2.5 (strongest) governance performance. 
landlocked country, (0/1)
share of people ages 65 or above out of total population
extent of political stability and absence of violence/terrorism index
extent to which people have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime and violence index
East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, 
North Africa and Middle East, North America, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
(0/1)
all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship except for regufeess, 
midyear estimates per 1,000,000 people
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain index 
gender gap score in economic participation and opportunity, educational 
attainment, health and survival and political empowerment, range of 0 
incidence of trafficking in a source country, (0/1)
incidence of natural disaster in 2011, (0/1)
Total number of deaths caused by natural disasters in 2012 per 10,000 deaths
Total number of injured caused by natural disasters in 2012 per 10,000 injured
Total number of people left homeless caused by natural disasters in 2012 per 
10,000 homeless
incidence of natural disaster (Earthquakes, Droughts, Floods, Storms, 
Landslides, Extreme temperatures ) in 2012 (0/1)
simple distance between source and destination countries (most populated 
cities) per 1,000 km
sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of GDP 
per $100
share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking 
employment
the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 100,000 live 
births in 2012
extent of voting rights, freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom 
of media index
    
Table 2: Summary Statistics, country level without scales
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Disaster Data
Disaster12 dummy 120 0.725 0.448 0 1
Disaster11 dummy 120 0.583 0.495 0 1
Total Deaths 120 75.658 251.027 0 2385
Total Injured 120 522.3 3579.334 0 38567
Total Homeless 120 6217.267 29549.09 0 297045
Total Affected12 in millions 120 0.839 4.33 0 44.6
Total Affected11 in millions 120 1.702 11.5 0 124
Controls 
GDP 120 14750.590 20858.570 244.197 105447.1
Landlocked dummy 120 0.208 0.408 0 1
Population in millions 120 54 172 320716 1350
Trade 117 87.740 45.727 25.267 348.122
Unemployment rate 119 8.230 5.526 0.2 31.1
Popu. 65 or above 120 8.872 5.821 2.327 24.287
Infant mortality 120 25.398 24.442 1.6 104.1
Voice and Accountability 120 -0.026 0.982 -1.883 1.753
Political Stability 120 -0.193 0.924 -2.686 1.398
Rule of Law 120 -0.095 1.034 -1.723 1.949
Control of Corruption 120 -0.056 1.060 -1.561 2.391
Gender Gap Score 104 0.691 0.061 0.546 0.873
East Asia and Pacific 120 0.108 0.312 0 1
Europe and Central Asia 120 0.333 0.473 0 1
Latin America and Caribbean 120 0.183 0.389 0 1
North Africa and Middle east 120 0.075 0.264 0 1
North America 120 0.017 0.129 0 1
South Asia 120 0.058 0.235 0 1
Sub-Saharan Africa 120 0.225 0.419 0 1
!
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of the Estimation Sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Trafficking
Trafficking Dummy 14280 0.046 0.209 0 1
Disaster
Disaster12 Dummy 14280 0.725 0.447 0 1
Disaster11 Dummy 14280 0.583 0.493 0 1
Disaster Intensity
Total Deaths12 14280 0.008 0.025 0 0.239
Total Injured12 14280 0.052 0.356 0 3.857
Total Homeless12 14280 0.622 2.943 0 29.705
Total Affected12 14280 0.839 4.312 0 44.563
Total Affected11 14280 1.702 11.438 0 124.300
Controls 
Source-Destination distance 14042 7.462 4.339 0.081 19.812
GDP Source 14280 1.475 2.077 0.024 10.545
GDP Destination 14280 1.475 2.077 0.024 10.545
Landlocked Source 14280 0.208 0.406 0 1
Landlocked Destination 14280 0.208 0.406 0 1
Population Source 14280 5.371 17.085 0.032 135
Population Destination 14280 5.371 17.085 0.032 135
Trade Source 13923 0.877 0.455 0.253 3.481
Trade Destination 13923 0.877 0.455 0.253 3.481
Unemployment rate Source 14161 8.230 5.503 0.2 31.1
Unemployment rate Destination 14161 8.230 5.503 0.2 31.1
Popu. 65 or above Source 14280 8.872 5.797 2.327 24.287
Popu. 65 or above Destination 14280 8.872 5.797 2.327 24.287
Infant mortality Source 14280 0.254 0.243 0.016 1.041
Infant mortality Destination 14280 0.254 0.243 0.016 1.041
Governance Factors
Voice and Accountability Source 14280 -0.026 -0.978 -1.883 1.753
Voice and Accountability Destination 14280 -0.026 -0.978 -1.883 1.753
Political Stability Source 14280 -0.193 -0.920 -2.686 1.398
Political Stability Destination 14280 -0.193 -0.920 -2.686 1.398
Rule of Law Source 14280 -0.095 1.030 -1.723 1.949
Rule of Law Destination 14280 -0.095 1.030 -1.723 1.949
Control of Corruption Source 14280 -0.056 -1.055 -1.561 2.391
Control of Corruption Destination 14280 -0.056 -1.055 -1.561 2.391
Social Factors
Gender gap score Source 12376 0.691 0.060 0.546 0.873
Gender gap score Destination 12376 0.691 0.060 0.546 0.873
Continent Region dummies
East Asia and Pacific Source 14280 0.108 0.311 0 1
East Asia and Pacific Destination 14280 0.108 0.311 0 1
Europe and Central Asia Source 14280 0.333 0.471 0 1
Europe and Central Asia Destination 14280 0.333 0.471 0 1
Latin America and Caribbean Source 14280 0.183 0.387 0 1
Latin America and Caribbean Destination 14280 0.183 0.387 0 1
North Africa and Middle East Source 14280 0.075 0.263 0 1
North Africa and Middle East Destination 14280 0.075 0.263 0 1
North America Source 14280 0.017 0.128 0 1
North America Destination 14280 0.017 0.128 0 1
South Asia Source 14280 0.058 0.234 0 1
South Asia Destination 14280 0.058 0.234 0 1
Sub-Saharan Africa Source 14280 0.225 0.418 0 1
Sub-Saharan Africa Destination 14280 0.225 0.418 0 1
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Table&4:&Regions&and&Countries
East%Asia%and%
Pacific
Latin%America%and%
Caribbean
North%Africa%and%
Middle%East
North%America% South%Asia
Australia Albania Kazakhstan Argentina Algeria Canada Afghanistan Angola Gambia
Cambodia Armenia Kyrgyzstan Belize Djibouti United&States Bangladesh Benin Ghana
China Austria Lithuania Bolivia Egypt Bhutan Botswana Guinea
Fiji Azerbaijan Luxembourg Brazil Iran India Burkina&Faso GuineaJBissau
Indonesia Belarus Moldova Chile Israel Nepal Burundi Kenya
Japan Belgium Netherlands Colombia Jordan Pakistan Cabo&Verde Liberia
Korea,&Rep. Bosnia&and&
Herzegovina
Norway Costa&Rica Lebanon Sri&Lanka Cameroon Madagascar
Malaysia Bulgaria Poland Cuba Morocco Central&African&
Rep
Mauritania
Mongolia Croatia Portugal Dominican&Republic Sudan Chad Niger
New&Zealand Cyprus Romania Ecuador Comoros Nigeria
Philippines Czech&Republic Russia El&Salvador Cote&d'Ivoire Senegal
Thailand Denmark Spain Guatemala Equatorial&Guinea South&Africa
Vietnam Estonia Sweden Guyana Ethiopia Zimbabwe
Finland Switzerland Haiti Gabon
France Tajikistan Honduras
Georgia Turkey Jamaica
Germany Ukraine Mexico
Greece United&Kingdom Nicaragua
Hungary Panama
Iceland Peru
Ireland Uruguay
Italy Venezuela,&RB
Europe%and%Central%Asia Subsaharan%Africa
  
Table 6: Disaster Intensity Impact on Trafficking
Dependent Variable: Trafficking 
Panel Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Deaths 0.666*** 0.640*** 0.524*** 0.339***
(0.075) (0.077) (0.093) (0.100)
Total Injured 0.047*** 0.024*** 0.040*** 0.034***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Total Homeless 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R-squared 0.023 0.093 0.106 0.115
Total Affected12 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R-squared 0.019 0.090 0.103 0.114
Total Affected11 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R-squared 0.014 0.086 0.099 0.111
14,280 13,340 10,100 10,100Observations:
A
B
C
Notes: each panel represents a separate regression variant, controls are not included for 
brevity purposes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 5: Disaster Impact on Trafficking Excluding Economic Controls
Dependent Variable: Trafficking 
Panel Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Disaster12 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.023*** 0.014**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
R-squared 0.005 0.065 0.084 0.099
Disaster11 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.015*** -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
R-squared 0.001 0.061 0.083 0.098
14,280 14,042 10,506 10,506
A
B
Observations:
Notes: each panel represents a separate regression variant, controls are not included for 
brevity purposes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
                   
Table 7: Impact of Disasters on Economic Factors
Dependent Variable: GDP per capita
Panel Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Disaster12 -0.695 -0.974*** -0.026 -0.012
(0.423) (0.333) (0.300) (0.307)
R-squared 0.022 0.523 0.765 0.788
Disaster11 -0.258 0.626* 0.183 0.383
(0.387) (0.317) (0.260) (0.277)
R-squared 0.004 0.503 0.766 0.792
Dependent Variable: Trade Share of GDP 
Disaster12 -0.289*** -0.237** -0.214* -0.194*
(0.092) (0.094) (0.108) (0.110)
R-squared 0.079 0.205 0.284 0.363
Disaster11 -0.268*** -0.250*** -0.176* -0.167
(0.083) (0.084) (0.095) (0.102)
R-squared 0.084 0.222 0.281 0.359
Dependent Variable: Unemployment Rate 
Disaster12 -0.724 -1.545 -2.820** -2.266*
(1.145) (1.231) (1.338) (1.346)
R-squared 0.003 0.123 0.182 0.296
Disaster11 -2.270** -1.282 -1.058 -0.134
(1.012) (1.127) (1.214) (1.284)
R-squared 0.041 0.121 0.149 0.272
120 117 102 102
Notes: each panel represents a separate regression variant, controls are not included for 
brevity purposes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
A
B
A
B
A
B
Observations:
!
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Table 8: Disaster Impact on Trafficking Including Economic Controls
Dependent Variable: Trafficking
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Disaster12 0.034*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.012**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Source Destination Distance -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.011***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP Source -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
GDP Destination 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.014***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Landlocked Dummy Source -0.013*** -0.021*** -0.015**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Landlocked Dummy Destination -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.019***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Population Source 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population Destination 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Trade of GDP Source 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.020***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Trade of GDP Destination -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Unemployment Rate Source -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployment Rate Destination -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Popu. 65 or Above Source 0.001** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Popu. 65 or Above Destination -0.001** -0.002*** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Infant Mortality Source -0.009 0.022 0.007
(0.011) (0.015) (0.025)
Infant Mortality Destination -0.041*** -0.069*** -0.092***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.025)
Voice and Accountability Source 0.004 0.017***
(0.005) (0.006)
Voice and Accountability Desination. -0.001 -0.005
(0.005) (0.006)
Political Stability Source -0.003 -0.014***
(0.004) (0.005)
Political Stability Destination -0.001 -0.009**
(0.004) (0.005)
Rule of Law Source -0.000 -0.022*
(0.009) (0.011)
Rule of Law Destination 0.034*** 0.044***
(0.009) (0.011)
Control of Corruption Source -0.014* -0.003
(0.008) (0.009)
Control of Corruption Destination -0.024*** -0.027***
(0.008) (0.009)
Gender Gap Score Source 0.261*** 0.235***
(0.048) (0.052)
Gender Gap Score Destination -0.124*** -0.183***
(0.048) (0.052)
Constant 0.021*** 0.147*** 0.047 0.099*
(0.003) (0.014) (0.051) (0.059)
Observations 14,280 13,340 10,100 10,100
R-squared 0.005 0.087 0.099 0.111
Notes: country/region variables are controlled for but not included for brevity purposes. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
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